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 'The second labour of Hercules was to kill the Lernean Hydra. From the murky waters of the swamps near a 
place called Lerna, the hydra would rise up and terrorise the countryside. A monstrous serpent with nine heads, 
the hydra attacked with poisonous venom. Nor was this beast easy prey, for one of the nine heads was 
immortal and therefore indestructible.' 
 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/Herakles/hydra.html 
A metaphor, like a joke, should need no explanation. Unpacking the above title, however, 
will help to clarify the assumptions which the article sets out to test. For the 'hydra' is 
nothing more than the judge-made system of (y) contractual rules replicating and 
substituting the statutory backbone of employment law that has emerged over the last few 
years, its burgeoning heads seemingly resistant to all efforts by critics at cutting it down to 
size. And it is suggested that this 'monstrous serpent' springs from nothing more profound 
than the murky depths of forum-shopping, the amorphous fluidity of which stands in stark 
contrast to the well-structured clarity which the law is supposed to possess. The article will 
not reiterate the debate which this development, and various questions arising from it, has 
produced. 2   Rather, it will focus on the question of its constitutionality; to be precise, it 
will try to show that this development is fundamentally unconstitutional. And it will suggest 
that something else should have emerged from the proper interpretation of the Constitution 
and the Labour Relations Act (LRA). 3 
The starting-point is that s 23 of the Constitution (the 'labour section') is the foundation of 
all our labour law - that is, of our labour legislation as well as the common law where 
legislation is silent. The first part of this statement is uncontentious. This article is devoted, 
in essence, to establishing the import of the last four words. 
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The First Head Emerges 
The problem first emerged in a specific area of the law of dismissal. It was formulated as 
follows by the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Fedlife Assurance Ltd v 
Wolfaardt: 4 
 '[T]here can be no suggestion that the constitutional dispensation deprived employees of the common-law right 
to enforce the terms of a fixed-term contract of employment. Thus irrespective of whether the 1995 [Labour 
Relations] Act was declaratory of rights that had their source in the interim Constitution or whether it created 
substantive rights itself, the question is whether it simultaneously deprived employees of their pre-existing 
common-law right to enforce such contracts, thereby confining them to the remedies for 'unlawful dismissal' as 
provided for in the 1995 Act. . .. 
 In considering whether the 1995 Act should be construed to that effect it must be borne in mind that it is 
presumed that the legislature did not intend to interfere with existing law and a fortiori, not to deprive parties 
of existing remedies for wrongs done to them. A statute will be construed as doing so only if that appears 
expressly or by necessary implication . . .. The continued existence of the common-law right of employees to be 
fully compensated for the damages they can prove they have suffered by reason of an unlawful premature 
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termination by their employers of fixed-term contracts of employment is not in conflict with the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights and it is appropriate to invoke the presumption in the present case. 
 The 1995 Act does not expressly abrogate an employee's common-law entitlement to enforce contractual rights 
and nor do I think that it does so by necessary implication. On the contrary there are clear indications in the 
1995 Act that the legislature had no intention of doing so.' 
With respect, however, these 'indications' are less than clear. The first one is the fact that 
non-renewal of a fixed-term contract may under certain circumstances amount to 'dismissal' 
5   (which may be either fair or unfair), which the court took to mean that the legislature 
intended 6   to preserve the common-law remedies available to employees whose 
fixed-term contracts are terminated prematurely (ie, unlawfully), regardless of fairness. The 
possibility that an employee on a fixed-term contract might have exactly the same remedies 
for dismissal as an employee on an indefinite contract is brushed aside as an 'absurdity'. No 
less 'absurd', in the eyes of the majority, is the proposition that an employee on a 
fixed-term contract who is dismissed for a fair reason and in accordance with a fair 
procedure should not be entitled to 
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compensation for unfair dismissal. 'Such a result', it was held, 'could never have been the 
intention of the legislature'. 7 
The second 'indication' relied on by the majority of the SCA is the fact that '[a]n order or 
award of compensation made in terms of this chapter is in addition to, and not a substitute 
for, any other amount to which the employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective 
agreement or contract of employment'. 8   This was taken to mean that an employee must 
necessarily be able to claim damages for breach of contract (as opposed to, for example, 
entitlements stipulated in a contract) over and above - or, apparently, instead of - any claim 
for compensation for unfair dismissal in terms of s 193 of the LRA. 9 
With hindsight, what characterizes the reasoning of the majority is the certainty with which 
it makes assumptions that are, to say the least, tenuous. The first assumption is that the 
LRA, though its wording in no way suggests it, set out to create separate regimes for 
employees on fixed-term contract and those on indefinite contract. Only the latter, in this 
approach, are 'limited' to the statutory remedies laid down for unfair dismissal. The second 
assumption is that premature ('unlawful') termination of a fixed-term contract is, in and of 
itself, 'manifestly unfair'. 10   'Unlawfulness' in terms of common law, in other words, is 
equated with 'unfairness' regardless of the fairness of the reason for dismissal or the 
procedure followed. To this extent, it seems, common law trumps statute by ring-fencing 
certain contractual remedies (unlike their administrative law counterparts, as noted below) 
against remedies created by the legislature in giving effect to the Constitution, unless the 
latter expressly or 'by necessary implication' overrides them. And enacting a policy driven 
remedy in an area where a common-law remedy already exists, in the view of the SCA, 
evinces no constitutional purpose or legislative intention of superseding the latter; on the 
contrary, it is assumed, the purpose as well as the intention is that two overlapping or 
competing remedies should continue to exist side by side. 
Both these assumptions are open to serious question. To begin with, the notion that 'the 
legislature did not intend to interfere with existing [common] law' when creating new 
statutory rights can, as a general proposition, no longer be sustained. While this may have 
been true in the pre-constitutional dispensation, it can hardly be said of statutes 
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which are enacted for the express purpose of giving effect to fundamental rights. 
Pre-existing common-law remedies, by implication, are deemed insufficient for this purpose; 
and, this being so, there are no clear grounds for assuming that those remedies will 
automatically continue to coexist with their statutory counterparts. Rather, the opposite 
may be inferred. In the field of administrative law the Constitutional Court (CC) has laid 
down this principle clearly, and uncontroversially, as follows: 
 'There are not two systems of law regulating administrative action - the common law and the Constitution - but 
only one system of law grounded in the Constitution. The courts' power to review administrative action no 
longer flows directly from the common law but from PAJA 11   and the Constitution itself. The grundnorm of 
administrative law is now to be found in the first place not in the doctrine of ultra vires, nor in the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, nor in the common law itself, but in the principles of our Constitution. The common 
law informs the provisions of PAJA and the Constitution, and derives its force from the latter. The extent to 
which the common law remains relevant to administrative review will have to be developed on a case-by-case 
basis as the courts interpret and apply the provisions of PAJA and the Constitution.' 12 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), like the LRA, was enacted to give effect 
to a constitutional right. 13   PAJA, like the LRA, contains no provision expressly abolishing 
the pre-existing common-law remedies; like the LRA it is silent on the issue. Indeed, unlike 
the LRA, PAJA contains no provision giving it precedence over other laws in the event of 
conflict. 14   Yet, despite PAJA's reticence, the CC in Bato Star had no difficulty in finding 
that, to all intents and purposes, PAJA had taken precedence over competing common-law 
provisions - as it were, 'by necessary implication'. 
Exactly the same, one would have thought, should apply to provisions of the LRA in relation 
to pre-existing common-law remedies. 15   This proposition is fortified by s 210 of the LRA 
(cited in fn 14): if the LRA must prevail over any other legislation in the event of conflict, it 
would be incongruous if it did not also prevail over common-law rules in the event of 
conflict. Yet this incongruity went unnoticed in the majority judgment in Fedlife v Wolfaardt. 
And the Fedlife judgment does create conflict between its interpretation 
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of the common law and the regime created by the LRA. In particular: 
(a) It creates inequality between employees on fixed-term contract and those on 
indefinite contract by immunizing the former against dismissal based on a fair reason 
other than gross misconduct (ie, fundamental breach of contract) and in accordance 
with a fair procedure. 16   Thus, an employer faced with the need to carry out 
dismissals based on operational requirements will be precluded from selecting 
employees on fixed-term contract and limited to selecting employees on indefinite 
contract, in possible violation of the latter's right to substantive or procedural fairness. 
(b) It further privileges employees on fixed-term contract by exempting them from those 
limitations which the legislature, in a considered effort to give effect to the purposes of 
the LRA and strike a fair balance between the interests of employers and workers, 
decided to place on the procedure for resolving dismissal disputes. 17   Notably, 
employees pursuing a contractual remedy are not required to do so within 30 days 18   
but are allowed three years in which to issue summons. 19   This, needless to say, 
severely undermines the statutory objective of promoting 'the effective resolution of 
labour disputes'. 20   Employees on fixed-term contract are also not restricted to 
claiming compensation in the amounts laid down in s 194 of the LRA but may claim 
any amount of remuneration due in respect of the unexpired period of the contract, 
irrespective of the fairness of the employer's actions. 
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The constitutional implications of these incongruities are only too clear. The LRA, in giving 
effect to s 23(1) of the Constitution, permits an employer to dismiss an employee for a fair 
reason after following a fair procedure. Though not expressed as a 'right', it is a 
manifestation of the employer's right to fair labour practices which, at the same time, 
defines the limit of the employee's right not be dismissed 'unfairly'. 21   By excluding an 
employer's right to dismiss an employee on fixed-term contract under any circumstances, 
except for fundamental 
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breach or if the contract expressly permits it, the SCA is limiting the employer's right to fair 
labour practices as well as redefining the content of s 185 of the LRA in respect of 
employees on fixed-term contract. Basic rights, however, may only be limited by 'law of 
general application', 22   and no basis for such a limitation can be found in the LRA. The 
inference is therefore that the common law is the source of the limitation - which, again, 
would amount to asserting the common law in the face of the LRA's provisions allowing an 
employer to dismiss fairly. And, even if it were permissible for the common law to limit the 
employer's statutory entitlements, the question would be whether such a limitation meets 
the criteria laid down by s 36(1) of the Constitution. Given the remoteness of the issue it is 
not proposed to pursue that exercise save to suggest that the limitation would fail the test. 
What is significant, however, is that the SCA in Fedlife also made no attempt to apply the 
constitutional test nor, indeed, to consider the questions already noted. These questions 
thus remain unanswered. 
It should be emphasized before going further that the above criticism by no means denies 
the vulnerable position in which many employees on fixed-term contract find themselves 
nor the need to provide them with all possible protection. On the contrary, this very 
important question will be returned to later on. At this point the argument is only that the 
majority judgment in Fedlife flies in the face of established principles of constitutional 
interpretation (as will be discussed below) and the system by which the legislature sought 
to give effect to the right to fair labour practices. In effect, it allows litigants to circumvent 
that system at will. Worse, it may inadvertently have laid a basis for separate systems of 
labour dispute resolution: one for the rich and one for the poor. Common-law remedies can 
only be pursued by employees who have access to the resources to litigate in the courts; for 
the vast majority of employees the system created by the LRA offers the only redress. 
This interpretation is underlined by the majority view in Fedlife that it would be 'bereft of 
any rationality' to 'confine' an employee whose fixed-term has been unlawfully terminated 
'to the limited and entirely arbitrary compensation yielded by the application of the formula 
in s 194' of the LRA. 23   'Bereft of any rationality' or not, the LRA in giving effect to s 23(1) 
of the Constitution deliberately limits compensation for unfair dismissal to these 'limited and 
entirely arbitrary' amounts. The question here is not whether it behoves any court to be 
quite so dismissive of the constitutional scheme which it is bound to uphold. The point is 
rather that it accentuates the inequality being created between different classes of litigants 
- in effect, between 
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more and less generous remedies based on litigants' access to resources. Truly vulnerable 
workers on fixed-term contract hardly benefit from the theoretical possibility of pursuing 
claims for contractual damages in the High Court (HC) or the Labour Court (LC). 
 




More Heads Appear 
It might be argued that the problem described above can be avoided simply by inserting 
clauses in fixed-term contracts regulating their premature termination. This is true; but in a 
series of later judgments the SCA (followed by some lower courts) extended the incursion of 
common law into the domain of the LRA well beyond the bridgehead carved out by Fedlife. 
As a result, labour law has been left in a state that can best be described as uncertain. Van 
Niekerk J in Mogothle v Premier of the Northwest Province & another 24   captures this 
development, and some of the questions it raises, in terms that deserve to be quoted at 
some length: 
 'In a trio of recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal, that court has emphasized the mutual 
relationship of trust and confidence that the common-law contract of employment imposes on both employers 
and employees. In Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi (2007) 28 ILJ 1499 (SCA); [2007] 8 BLLR 699 
(SCA), the SCA ruled that the common-law contract of employment should be developed in the light of the 
Constitution, specifically to include a contractual right to a pre-dismissal hearing. The court reasoned as follows 
at para 5: 
  'It is clear, however, that coordinate rights are now protected by the common law: to the extent 
necessary, as developed under the constitutional imperative (s 39(2)) to harmonize the common law 
into the Bill of Rights (which itself includes the right to fair labour practices (s 23(1)).' 
 The Gumbi judgment was confirmed in Boxer Superstores Mthatha & another v Mbenya (2007) 28 ILJ 2209 
(SCA); [2007] 8 BLLR 693 (SCA). In that case, the court held at para 6: 
  "This court has recently held that the common-law contract of employment has been developed in 
accordance with the Constitution to include a right to a pre-dismissal hearing (Old Mutual Life Assurance 
Co SA Ltd v Gumbi). This means that every employee now has a common-law contractual claim - not 
merely a statutory unfair labour practice right - to a pre-dismissal hearing." 
 More recently, in Murray v Minister of Defence (2008) 29 ILJ 1369 (SCA); [2008] 6 BLLR 513 (SCA), the SCA 
derived a contractual right not to be constructively dismissed from what it held to be a duty on all employers of 
fair dealing at all times with their employees (at 517C). This obligation, a continuing obligation of fairness that 
rests on an employer when it makes decisions that affect an employee at work, was held by the court to have 
both a procedural and a substantive dimension. 
 The development of the common law by the SCA is not uncontroversial. It has been criticized, amongst other 
grounds, for opening the door to a dual jurisprudence in which common-law principles are permitted to 
compete with the protection conferred by the unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice provisions of the LRA 
(see, for example, Halton Cheadle 'Labour Law and the 
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 Constitution' a paper given to the annual SASLAW Conference in October 2007 and published in Current Labour 
Law 2008, the comments by P A K le Roux at 3 of the same publication, and the article by Paul Pretorius SC & 
Anton Myburgh 'A Dual System of Dismissal Law: Comment on Boxer Superstores Mthatha & another v Mbenya 
(2007) 28 ILJ 2209 (SCA)' published in (2007) 28 ILJ 2172). 25   Be that as it may, the SCA has unequivocally 
established a contractual right to fair dealing that binds all employers, a right that may be enforced by all 
employees both in relation to substance and procedure, and which exists independently of any statutory 
protection against unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices. 26   This court is bound by the authorities to 
which I have referred and is obliged, in the absence of any higher authority, to enforce the contractual right of 
fair dealing as between employer and employee.' 27 
If anything, these carefully chosen remarks understate the extent of the 'recipe for chaos' 
inherent in this development. 28   On the one hand, having let the common-law genie out 
of the bottle (if metaphors may be mixed), there seems to be no reason why the SCA 
should stop at the contractual remedies it has thus far asserted in the terrain previously 
governed by the LRA. On the basis of Fedlife, for example, there would seem to be no 
reason why a claim for delictual damages, including future loss of earnings, could not be 
combined with a claim of unfair dismissal. 29   What we have seen thus far may only be (to 
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mix metaphors even further) the tip of the iceberg. On the other hand, the depth of the 
controversy is more profound than may appear at first sight. In a number of well-considered 
and authoritative judgments the labour courts and the HC as well as the CC have developed 
an 
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approach which goes contrary to that of the SCA and which, it will be argued, is one that 
ought to prevail. 
 
 
Striking Back: From Naptosa to Chirwa 
Even prior to the Fedlife judgment warnings had been sounded against the problems 
inherent in the creation of overlapping jurisdictions by allowing remedies derived from other 
sources (including common law) to compete with remedies expressly created by the LRA for 
the purpose of resolving labour disputes. Indeed, already in the Explanatory Memorandum 
to the Draft Labour Relations Bill of 1995, after noting the different laws applicable to 
different categories of employees, the following was said: 
 'Such a multiplicity of laws creates inconsistency, unnecessary complexity, duplication of resources and 
jurisdictional confusion. A single statute that applies to the whole economy but nevertheless accommodates the 
special features of its different sectors is far preferable.' 30 
An explanatory memorandum, of course, has no legal force (though it does make it more 
difficult to argue that the legislature, in enacting the ensuing statute, had the exact opposite 
in mind). However, the same theme has been taken up and restated by the courts in the 
clearest possible terms. In NAPTOSA & others v Minister of Education, Western Cape & 
others 31   the applicants approached the HC to seek a remedy based directly on s 23(1) of 
the Constitution in an employment dispute. Conradie and Jali JJ dealt with this aspect of the 
claim as follows: 
 'Mr du Plessis [for the applicants] candidly admitted that the unfair labour practice regime which the courts 
would, on his argument, have to apply under s 23 of the Constitution would resemble that developed by the 
Industrial Court. To grant relief which would encourage the development of two parallel systems would in my 
view be singularly inappropriate. Taking into account the right to fair labour practices and the duties imposed 
thereby on employers and employees alike, it is not a right which can, without an intervening regulatory 
framework, be applied directly in the workplace. The social and policy issues are too complex for that. The 
consequences of adopting Mr du Plessis's argument would be dramatic. For example, an unfair dismissal, which 
is undoubtedly an unfair labour practice would become justiciable in the High Court without having been aired 
before the CCMA. . . . 
 Martin Brassey and Carole Cooper writing in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of SA state at 30-13: 
  "Yet, in the labour field, the issue of the horizontal application of the labour relations rights to private 
citizens will be mainly academic. This is because existing labour legislation already regulates, to a large 
degree, private conduct between employers and employees. The horizontal reach of the labour rights will 
therefore extend to those matters falling within the scope of the rights but not covered by existing 
legislation. The exact extent of this reach is particularly 
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  unclear with regard to the right to fair labour practices because of its open-textured nature. Depending 
on the scope given to this right, potential areas for its application to private conduct relate to the duty to 
bargain (which has been deliberately excluded from labour legislation), employment issues beyond the 
confines of the employer-employee relationship, and employer-employee issues which may be regarded 
as fair labour practices but are not covered by legislation." 
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 We are not, of course, here concerned with a case of horizontal application of the Constitution. Yet I cannot 
conceive that it is permissible for an applicant, save by attacking the constitutionality of the LRA, to go beyond 
the regulatory framework which it establishes.' 32 
And in Langeveldt v Vryburg Transitional Local Council & others 33   Zondo JP forcefully 
expressed himself on the subject of competing jurisdictions: 
 'By virtue of the provisions of s 157(1) only the Labour Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate [disputes about 
breach of picketing rules]. However, insofar as landlords or property owners such as were involved in Fourways 
34   cannot approach the Labour Court for relief on the basis that there is no employer-employee relationship 
between them and the strikers, the result may well be that proceedings may have to be instituted in two 
separate superior courts for virtually the same acts which are committed by the same people in the same place 
and at the same time. This could lead to a situation where judges of two different courts of the same status 
become involved in the adjudication of virtually the same conduct committed by the same party at the same 
time with the inherent risk that the two courts may give conflicting judgments. This runs contrary to the very 
purpose of developing a certain and coherent system of law. It is also totally unacceptable in that it is not 
cost-effective. 
 To compound the problem, if there were to be an appeal against each of the two judgments of these two 
counts, such appeals would go to two different appeal courts of the same status, namely, the Labour Appeal 
Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. If the two appeal courts were to give conflicting judgments, and there 
was no constitutional issue to be taken to the Constitutional Court, the result would be an intolerable one. 
There is no justification for any of this. The dispute resolution system applicable to all employment and labour 
disputes needs to be streamlined as far as possible.' 
Ironically, the judgment in Fedlife - as Grogan puts it, '[giving] impetus to the state of 
affairs which Zondo JP deplored in Vryburg TLC' - was handed down some seven months 
later. But, although the 'discussion' of 'some of the implications' by Zondo JP was mentioned 
in this judgment, the problems which it identified were not considered. 35 
The CC, as we know, has addressed the issue of competing jurisdictions 
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in two important judgments which, unfortunately, have failed to settle it decisively and were 
widely regarded as being at variance with each other. In Fredericks & others v MEC for 
Education & Training, Eastern Cape & others 36   it was held that the LC does not have 
exclusive jurisdiction in all labour matters and that the HC retains jurisdiction in labour 
disputes involving the violation of constitutional rights which have not been assigned to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the LC. 37   Significantly, however, O'Regan J added: 
 'It is important to note that in this case, the applicants expressly disavow any reliance on s 23(1) of the 
Constitution, which entrenches the right to fair labour practices. The preamble to the Labour Relations Act 
makes it plain that the purpose of the Act is to give statutory effect to this right. The question therefore does 
not arise in this case whether a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of a collective agreement 
gives rise to a constitutional complaint in terms of s 23(1). That question raises difficult issues of constitutional 
interpretation that we need not address now. 38 
In the more recent case of Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & others, 39   however, the CC did have 
occasion to address those 'difficult issues' - specifically, the reach of the dispute-resolution 
system created by the LRA and, consequently, the limits of the jurisdiction of the HC in 
disputes based on the right to fair labour practices. 40   In one of two majority judgments 
handed down, Skweyiya J held as follows: 41 
 'Ms Chirwa's claim is that the disciplinary enquiry held to determine her poor work performance was not 
conducted fairly and, therefore, her dismissal following such enquiry was not effected in accordance with a fair 
procedure. This is a dispute envisaged by s 191 of the LRA, which provides a procedure for its resolution: 
including conciliation, arbitration and review by the Labour Court. The dispute concerning dismissal for poor 
work performance, which is covered by the LRA and for which specific dispute resolution procedures have been 
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created, is therefore a matter that must, under the LRA, be determined exclusively by the Labour Court. 
Accordingly, it is my finding that the High Court had no concurrent jurisdiction with the Labour Court to decide 
this matter. 
 Ms Chirwa was correct in referring her dismissal to the CCMA as an unfair dismissal in terms of s 191(1)(a)(ii) 
of the LRA. The constitutional right she sought to vindicate is regulated in detail by the LRA. In this regard, the 
remarks 
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 made by Ngcobo J in relation to a specialist tribunal in Hoffmann v SA Airways 42   are apposite: 
  "The question of testing in order to determine suitability for employment is a matter that is now 
governed by s 7(2), read with s 50(4), of the Employment Equity Act. In my view there is much to be 
said for the view that where a matter is required by statute to be dealt with by a specialist tribunal, it is 
that tribunal that must deal with such a matter in the first instance. The Labour Court is a specialist 
tribunal that has a statutory duty to deal with labour and employment issues. Because of this expertise, 
the legislature has considered it appropriate to give it jurisdiction to deal with testing in order to 
determine suitability for employment. It is, therefore, that court which, in the first instance, should deal 
with issues relating to testing in the context of employment." . . . 
 The LRA is the primary source in matters concerning allegations by employees of unfair dismissal and unfair 
labour practice, irrespective of who the employer is, and includes the state and its organs as employers. 
 Ms Chirwa's case is based on an allegation of an unfair dismissal for alleged poor work performance. The LRA 
specifically legislates the requirements in respect of disciplinary enquiries and provides guidelines in cases of 
dismissal for poor work performance. . . . She was, in my view, not at liberty to relegate the finely tuned 
dispute-resolution structures created by the LRA. If this is allowed, a dual system of law would fester in cases of 
dismissal of employees by employers, one applicable in civil courts and the other applicable in the forums and 
mechanisms established by the LRA.' 
The import of this ruling is to address the question left open in Fredericks and suggest that 
it should be answered in the negative: to the extent that the right to fair labour practices is 
regulated by the LRA, disputes arising from its violation fall to be resolved by the 
dispute-resolution machinery created by the LRA and are excluded from the jurisdiction of 
the HC. 
What, then, of s 157(2) of the LRA, which confers concurrent jurisdiction on the HC and the 
LC in respect of disputes arising from the violation of basic rights in the employment 
context? In a further majority judgment Ngcobo J interpreted this provision as follows: 
 'While s 157(2) remains on the statute book, it must be construed in the light of the primary objectives of the 
LRA. The first is to establish a comprehensive framework of law governing the labour and employment relations 
between employers and employees in all sectors. The other is the objective to establish the Labour Court and 
Labour Appeal Court as superior courts, with exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters arising from the LRA. In 
my view, the only way to reconcile the provisions of s 157(2) and harmonize them with those of s 157(1) and 
the primary objects of the LRA, is to give s 157(2) a narrow meaning. The application of s 157(2) must be 
confined to those instances, if any, where a party relies directly on the provisions of the Bill of Rights. This, of 
course, is subject to the constitutional principle that we have recently reinstated, namely, that 'where 
legislation is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, a litigant may not bypass that legislation and rely 
directly on the Constitution without challenging that legislation as falling short of the constitutional standard'. 
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 The employee cannot, as the applicant seeks to do, avoid the dispute-resolution mechanisms provided for in the 
LRA by alleging a violation of a constitutional right in the Bill of Rights. . . . To hold otherwise would frustrate 
the primary objects of the LRA and permit an astute litigant to bypass the dispute-resolution provisions of the 
LRA. This would inevitably give rise to forum-shopping simply because it is convenient to do so.' 43 
A clearer affirmation of the primacy of the rights and remedies contained in the LRA in 
resolving labour disputes (that is, disputes based on alleged violations of the right to fair 
labour practices to the extent that this right is regulated or 'envisaged' by the LRA) is 
difficult to imagine. To the extent that the court distinguished Fredericks rather than 
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expressly overruling the inference that the LRA may indeed be 'bypassed' by 'alleging a 
violation of a constitutional right in the Bill of Rights', however, scope has remained for 
judges of the HC to continue to entertain labour disputes framed in terms of basic rights 
other than s 23. The result has been a degree of uncertainty, manifested in the emergence 
of conflicting decisions - a further twist in the scenario deplored by Zondo JP on the eve of 
the Fedlife judgment. 44 
 
 
Missing the Immortal Head 
In Gcaba v Minister of Safety & Security & others 45   the CC acknowledged the uncertainty 
that had arisen and set out to 'provide some clarity and guidance'. 46   Once again the 
issue before the court was conduct by the state in its capacity as employer which, according 
to the applicant, amounted to administrative action and, as such, fell within the jurisdiction 
of the HC. Van der Westhuizen J, writing for a unanimous court, had no difficulty in deciding 
that the applicant's claim was not based on administrative action and ruled that it fell within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the LC. More significant for present purposes, however, is the 
way in which the court sought to reconcile the tension between Fredericks and Chirwa. 
Recapitulating its reasoning in both matters at some length 47   and emphasizing the 
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importance of precedent in the interests of legal certainty, 48   the judgment reiterates the 
'narrow' interpretation of s 157(2) of the LRA laid down by Ngcobo J. 49   It also reiterates 
the argument against forum-shopping at the expense of 'the finely tuned dispute-resolution 
structures created by the LRA', 50   to that extent fortifying the case for a narrow 
interpretation of the role of the HC in labour matters. Section 157(1), the judgment 
concludes- 
 'confirms that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over any matter that the LRA prescribes should be 
determined by it. That includes, amongst other things, reviews of the decisions of the CCMA under s 145. 
Section 157(1) should, therefore, be given expansive content to protect the special status of the Labour Court, 
and s 157(2) should not be read to permit the High Court to have jurisdiction over these matters as well'. 51 
The judgment is, however, silent as to the validity of contractual claims (falling within the 
concurrent jurisdiction of the LC and the 'civil courts') 52   competing with statutory 
remedies (excluded from the jurisdiction of the HC) - for the very good reason, no doubt, 
that this was not a question it was called upon to answer. But, as with Chirwa, certain 
inferences can be drawn from its characterization of the jurisdictional dividing line between 
the LC and the HC. Unfortunately, the further statements made by the court in this regard 
may at first sight appear to introduce a note of ambiguity: 
 '[S]ection 157(2) should not be understood to extend the jurisdiction of the High Court to determine issues 
which (as contemplated by s 157(1)) have been expressly conferred upon the Labour Court by the LRA. Rather, 
it should be interpreted to mean that the Labour Court will be able to determine constitutional issues which 
arise before it, in the specific jurisdictional areas which have been created for it by the LRA, and which are 
covered by s 157(2)(a), (b) and (c). 
 Furthermore, the LRA does not intend to destroy causes of action or remedies and s 157 should not be 
interpreted to do so. Where a remedy lies in the High Court, s 157(2) cannot be read to mean that it no longer 
lies there and should not be read to mean as much. Where the judgment of Ngcobo J in Chirwa speaks of a 
court for labour and employment disputes, it refers to labour and employment related disputes for which the 
LRA creates specific remedies. It does not mean that all other remedies which might lie in other courts like the 
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High Court and Equality Court, can no longer be adjudicated by those courts. If only the Labour Court could 
deal with disputes arising out of all employment relations, remedies would be wiped out, because the Labour 
Court (being a creature of statute with only selected remedies and powers) does not have the power to deal 
with the common-law or other statutory remedies.' 53   (Emphasis added.) 
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The final statement is inaccurate in that s 77(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(BCEA) confers jurisdiction on the LC 'to hear and determine any matter concerning a 
contract of employment'. This, however, is irrelevant to the question whether either the LC 
or the HC has jurisdiction to entertain a contractual claim where a statutory remedy has 
been enacted. On this question it will be seen that the italicized sentences are open to 
conflicting interpretations. The first sentence may be read as implying the exclusive nature 
of the 'specific remedies' created by the LRA (especially if it is assumed, as the court 
apparently did, that contractual remedies are excluded from the jurisdiction of the LC). 
Disputes concerning termination of the contract of employment clearly fall within this 
category. 54   The second italicized sentence, however, could be interpreted as meaning 
that contractual claims arising from the contract of employment, including its termination, 
remain within the jurisdiction of the HC. On the first reading Fedlife would have been 
wrongly decided while, on the second, it was correct. 
On closer inspection, however, the second sentence is not quite as broad as it seems. 
Earlier in the judgment the following explanation was offered of 'other remedies which 
might lie in other courts': 
 '[I]t is undoubtedly correct that the same conduct may threaten or violate different constitutional rights and 
give rise to different causes of action in law, often even to be pursued in different courts or fora. It speaks for 
itself that, for example, aggressive conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace could constitute a criminal 
offence, violate equality legislation, breach a contract, give rise to the actio iniuriarum in the law of delict and 
amount to an unfair labour practice.' 55 
It will be noted that the chosen example is not a dispute contemplated by the LRA for which 
the legislature designed a specific remedy intended to give effect to the right to fair labour 
practices - in other words, striking a careful balance between the rights of employers and 
employees. 56   Sexual aggression is capable of giving rise to different causes of action, 
rooted in different constitutional 
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rights, which can be sustained independently of one another and do not result in a blurring 
of jurisdictional lines between different forums. Or, to put it differently, if the labour law 
exercise of determining 'the real dispute between the parties' 57   were to be applied in a 
case such as this, it would be impossible to boil it down to just a single cause of action. This 
is so, primarily, because the legislature has not attempted to codify the applicable law and 
create a specific remedy. On the contrary, the perpetrator's conduct triggers various causes 
of action intended to protect the various rights that have been violated. This is clearly a 
different proposition from the remedies created by the LRA for the purpose of protecting a 
specific right - the right to fair labour practices - or, more precisely, a specific violation of 
that right in the form of unfair dismissal. It is where such remedies exist, as the court went 
on to hold in the passage cited above, that 's 157(2) should not be read to permit the High 
Court to have jurisdiction over these matters as well'. 
In the absence of an explicit ruling on the issue, however, the dividing line between 
common law and statute in dismissal disputes remains unsettled. Perhaps inevitably, given 
the tension between the position adopted by the SCA and that of the CC in Chirwa, 
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'differences of opinion' as stark as those addressed in Gcaba have emerged in recent case 
law dealing with the issue. In Mogothle v Premier of the Northwest Province & another, 58   
as noted already, Van Niekerk J found that the decisions of the SCA in Gumbi, Boxer 
Superstores and Murray remained intact and therefore binding. 59   It is, however, 
significant that the judgment reflects criticism of those decisions and accepts their authority 
not because they are considered to be correct but because they were handed down by a 
higher court. In Mohlaka v Minister of Finance & others, 60   on the other hand, Pillay J 
arrived at a different conclusion. Basing herself on the primacy of the statutory regime 
created by the LRA, the learned judge found that scope for developing the common law of 
employment is practically confined to situations where there is no legislation implementing 
the right to fair labour practices or where 'a mechanical application of the text of legislation 
has the effect of denying or diminishing rights in conflict with the Constitution'. 61   In 
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Gumbi and Boxer Superstores, therefore, reliance on common law in claiming a right to 
procedural fairness in dismissal was 'misplaced' in that- 
 '[t]his cause of action fell squarely within the LRA, which codified the common law. The SCA should not have 
accepted jurisdiction. . . . This was quite unnecessary. In the LRA, the legislature codified best practice and 
policy and took into account international standards of not only the ILO, but other international instruments 
such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the directives of the European Union. 
The codification of labour law under the LRA extended over more than a year. Consultation with experts from 
the ILO, with trade unions, employers' organizations and other stakeholders chiselled numerous drafts of the 
LRA until it was whittled to a state [that] was acceptable to all stakeholders. 
 The richness of the process of legislative law-making therefore far outweighs judicial law-making. Judicial law 
making arises when the law does not regulate a situation, not when the legislature exercises its prerogative to 
legislate, as it did for labour law'. 62 
As it was, Pillay J observed, Gumbi and Boxer Superstores 'together resuscitated all the 
problems that the LRA and the BCEA sought to avoid: competing jurisdiction, multiplicity of 
forums, high costs of protracted litigation, uncertainty about process, its costs, timing and 
outcome'. 63   In the light of Chirwa and the principle enunciated by the SCA in Makambi, 
64   however, the court found that it was not bound to follow these decisions. 65   From 
what has already been said, and for the reasons discussed below, it will be evident that the 
writer considers the approach of the court in Mohlaka preferable in that it is more consistent 
with (to use the language of the court in Gcaba) 'the proper interpretation and application of 
overlapping constitutional . . . and labour law provisions and principles'. 66 
The fundamental principle, it is submitted, is that enunciated in Bato Star, 67   restated in 
SANDU v Minister of Defence & others 68   and relied on by Ngcobo J in Chirwa. It was 
spelled out in the following terms by the majority of the CC in Minister of Health & another v 
New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd & others: 69 
 'Where, as here, the Constitution requires Parliament to enact legislation to give effect to the constitutional 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution, and Parliament enacts such legislation, it will ordinarily be impermissible 
for a litigant to found a 
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 cause of action directly on the Constitution without alleging that the statute in question is deficient in the 
remedies that it provides. Legislation enacted by Parliament to give effect to a constitutional right ought not to 
be ignored. And where a litigant founds a cause of action on such legislation, it is equally impermissible for a 
court to bypass the legislation and to decide the matter on the basis of the constitutional provision that is being 
given effect to by the legislation in question.' 70 
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Where legislation is silent, in other words, it is open to a party to seek a contractual remedy 
in order to enforce the right to fair labour practices or, if no such remedy can be found, to 
rely directly on the Constitution. 71   This may be done either in the HC or the LC. But there 
can be no basis for a litigant to 'ignore' legislation such as the LRA by seeking a contractual 
remedy where a statutory remedy has expressly been created, or for a court to 'bypass' 
such legislation by reverting to the underlying constitutional right and then 'developing' the 
common law to 'give effect' to it. Given that parliament has done so already, it is - as Pillay 
J put it - 'unnecessary' as well as 'impermissible'. 
 
 
A Purposive Approach 72 
It should be emphasized that the above position is advocated not simply because it is seen 
as being in accordance with the principles of constitutionalism. Taking a step back, it can be 
argued that the two approaches - that manifested in the SCA judgments discussed above as 
opposed to that adopted in Chirwa and Mohlaka - emanate from different conceptions of the 
purpose of labour law. In Fedlife the SCA proceeded from the role of labour law in protecting 
employees against the employer's common-law right to terminate the contract at will. 73   
Although the judgment does not spell it out, it appears to be premised on the need to 
maximize such protection and, hence, the logic of not removing a contractual remedy that is 
available to certain employees. Broadly speaking, this approach is in line with the traditional 
explanation of the role of labour law as developed by Kahn-Freund: '[T]he relation between 
an employer and an isolated employee or worker', as 
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it has famously been put, 'is typically a relation between a bearer of power and one who is 
not a bearer of power.' 74   The 'central purpose' of labour law, thus, is to ensure 'the 
effective operation of a voluntary system of collective bargaining' 75   while, at the same 
time, establishing minimum standards of employment primarily for the protection of 
individual employees. In Fedlife and in subsequent judgments, it seems clear, the rationale 
lies in the 'protective' function of labour law and, to this end, the preservation or extension 
of contractual remedies in addition to statutory remedies. 
While the protective function of labour law will remain incontestable for as long as inequality 
in bargaining power between employers and individual employees persists, much else has 
changed during the half-century and more since Kahn-Freund's views were formulated. 
Without delving into the complex questions that confront us in the era of globalization, 
suffice it to note that the 'purpose' set out in s 1 of the LRA is considerably broader than the 
traditional conception of the role of labour law. The central objective of the Act is 
encapsulated as '[advancing] economic development, social justice, labour peace and the 
democratisation of the work-place', and the means of doing so is 'by fulfilling the primary 
objects of this Act'. The 'primary objects', in turn, cover a wide spectrum of socio-economic 
activities, ranging from regulation of the right to fair labour practices (which applies to 
employers as well as employees) and giving effect to South Africa's obligations in terms of 
various conventions of the International Labour Organization to promoting the effective 
resolution of labour disputes. 
This multifaceted purpose is clearly far broader than the single objective of employee 
protection. It is, however, in line with the contemporary understanding of labour law as an 
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aspect of labour market regulation in the widest sense. Given the challenges of pursuing 
socio-economic development in an increasingly integrated world economy, policy-makers 
are compelled to take a holistic view of the various inter-related processes on which such 
development depends, including the factors by which labour markets are determined. 76   
At the same time, South Africa's constitutional dispensation necessitates a rights based 
approach in pursuing these objectives; that is to say, the fundamental rights of all people, 
both as individuals and as social actors, need to be defined vis-à-vis one another and 
protected in the 
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process. In adjudicating issues which impact on socio-economic development, it follows that 
courts need to be alive to the (often complex) purposes of the laws which they are 
interpreting. 
In the case of the LRA, s 1 requires this expressly. 77   Of all the issues regulated by the 
LRA, few are more critical in this context than the termination of employment for reasons 
based on the employer's operational requirements. That was, in essence, the issue at stake 
in Fedlife: the applicant's position had allegedly become redundant and the employer sought 
to terminate it for this reason. Without considering the broader purpose of the LRA the 
majority of the SCA ruled, in effect, that termination was impermissible irrespective of 
whether the applicant had any work to do. 78   Of course, by holding that the matter was 
justiciable in terms of the common law rather than the LRA, it might appear that the 
purpose of the LRA was removed from the equation. The common law, however, is also 
subject to interpretation in terms of the Constitution and, ironically, the SCA in Gumbi and 
later decisions had no hesitation in interpreting rights contained in the LRA as 
constitutionally mandated terms of the contract of employment. It would seem on this basis 
that the purposes of the LRA, derived from the Constitution, should also be implicit in the 
contract of employment. 
On balance, it is respectfully submitted, the approach adopted by the SCA in Fedlife was too 
narrow and the outcome it yielded was at odds with the purpose of the LRA. Transposed 
onto employment relations in general it places a blanket duty on employers to compensate 
employees on fixed-term contract whose services are terminated without regard for the 
circumstances of the dismissal, including the impact on the employer's operations, in an 
amount that bears no relation to that which is considered appropriate in the case of 
employees who are not on fixed-term contract. It also bears no relation to the purpose of 
the LRA. For this reason, in the final analysis, it cannot be good law. The approach adopted 
in Bato Star and Chirwa, on the other hand, would place the LRA centre-stage and ensure 
that disputes of this nature are dealt with in terms of its framework of 'finely tuned' 
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rights and duties aimed at promoting its broader socio-economic purpose. For this reason, 
in the last analysis, this approach deserves to prevail. 
The identical arguments do not apply to the decisions in Gumbi, Boxer Superstores and 
Murray, where the disputes related to disciplinary proceedings rather than the employer's 
operational requirements. But here, too, the integrity of the system created by the LRA is at 
stake. The effective resolution of labour disputes cannot be promoted by developing a dual 
regime of labour law, the common law one apparently becoming a mirror image of the 
statutory one, but with at least two very important checks and balances - the time-limit 
placed on the referral of disputes and the capping of compensation - removed. The full 
implications of this development have yet to be understood. The bottom line, however, is 
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that common-law judges are being invested with considerably broader discretion than that 
permitted by the LRA in fashioning precedent-setting remedies in areas of immense 
socio-economic sensitivity and importance. 79   The process of judicial law-making (for that 
is effectively what it amounts to) is complicated further by the adversarial nature of the 
process: disputes are argued by parties who are out to score points and win their case, with 
little or no thought for longer-term social goals. Judges are left to make critical decisions 
based on their personal interpretation of open-ended contractual rights and duties, such as 
'fair dealing' or 'trust and confidence', much as the Industrial Court was at large to give 




The challenge facing labour law is not to fashion contractual remedies for the protection of a 
small minority of senior employees who are already protected by statute, who can afford HC 
litigation and choose to avoid the remedies created by the LRA; certainly, that objective 
does not justify the 'development' of the common law in defiance of s 8(3)(a) of the 
Constitution. 80   There are far greater challenges - above all, to serve the developmental 
purpose outlined in s 1 of the LRA and, specifically, to better regulate the position of the 
growing numbers of 'non-standard' employees, many of whom fall beyond the de facto 
enjoyment of labour rights intended for 'standard' employees. The current economic 
recession, resulting in a rising tide 
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of dismissals for operational reasons, makes the challenge all the more urgent. 
Meeting these challenges calls for the development of a coherent system of labour law that 
is consistent not only with the Constitution but also with the broader institutional framework 
of labour market regulation. 81   Specifically, protection for employees on part-time 
contract should not be limited to ad hoc relief extended to those who succeed in bypassing 
the statutory system enacted to give effect to s 23(1) of the Constitution. It should be part 
of a comprehensive policy designed to adapt labour law to the realities of the present-day 
labour market. This objective, however, is obstructed rather than assisted by the evolution 
of a parallel regime of judge-made employment law dictated by the vagaries of the cases 
that happen to come before courts and the views of the judges who happen to preside. The 
role of the common law in our constitutional dispensation is not to usurp the role of the 
legislature but to supplement it if and where necessary. Areas such as dismissal, 
meticulously covered by statutory remedies, are not areas where the development of 
common law is called for. 
It is therefore submitted that the resuscitation of common-law remedies at the expense of 
the statutory (constitutional) regime in Fedlife was uncalled for. The subsequent 
'development' of the common law in Gumbi, Boxer Superstores and Murray 82   has 
compounded the confusion. But this cannot be the end of the story. Hercules, after all, 
managed to overcome the Lernean hydra in the end. Herculean though the labour may be, 
it will be necessary for South African labour lawyers to deal with this many-headed 
accretion of common-law remedies if we are to develop a coherent system of labour law. 
 1 The title has been borrowed (with the kind permission of its author) from Clive Thompson's 'A Bargaining Hydra 
Emerges from the Unfair Labour Practice Swamp' (1989) 10 ILJ 808, dealing with an aberration of a 
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different kind which has since been laid to rest (or has it?). A draft version was submitted to the 12th 
Annual Conference of the South African Society for Labour Law, Johannesburg, 23-24 October 2009. 
 * BA, LLB (UCT), LLD (Leiden); Professor of Law, University of the Western Cape. 
 2 See, for example, John Grogan 'Which Court When - and Why? Jurisdiction over Employment Disputes' 
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